stated. 6 In addition, WTO law -and especially the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) -alIows Member States to adopt trade-restrictive measures in order to protect the environment as long as they respect the principles of non-discrimination and of proportionality (objective of minimising negative trade effects). Article XX of GATT 1994 alIows trade measures which protect human, animal or plant Iife or health, and which relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. The TBT Agreement also foresees the domestic implementation of voluntary standards and mandatory technical regulations for essentially the same objectives. Finally, the SPS Agreement provides explicitly for the right of an import· ing country to establish sanitary and phytosanitary measures to proteer the health and Iife ofhumans, animaIs and plants, provided they conform to strict scientific risk-assessment procedures. It should therefore be possible to make trade and environmental agreements not only compatible but mutually supportive. This possibility of building and reinforcing bridges between environmental considerations and economic concerns has been recognised by a dictum of the Tribunal in the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine ('ljzeren Rijn') Railway: 
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This chapter will start from the main idea that there is no a priori confliet between MEAs and WTO law. Tbe rationale for conflict is to be put aside and priority is to be given de lege lata and de lege ferenda to principles and criteria of coexistence and coherence between MEAs and WTO law." These principles of coexistence and coherence are contained principally in the generic principle of mutual supportiveness. Biotechnology is an interesting area for the assessment of the applicability of such criteria of coexistence and coherence; indeed, the international regulation ofbiotechnology, as analysed in the first part, shows that biotechnology is at the crossroads of trade and the environment and that rules and principles governing biotechnology have to take into account both trade and environ mental concerns. From this observation, the chapter will go on to assess whether the theory of conflict between WTO Agreements and MEAs is a myth or a reality before emphasising the need to transcend the logic of confliet through new paths and principles of coexistence or 'convergence'" Finally, a more practical or pragmatic approach will be taken by showing that trade-restrictive measures which are or may be contained in biotechnology regulations B The international regulation of biotechnology at the crossroads of trade and environment
The international regulation of modern biotechnology is based mainly on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Due to the scope of the Protocol, to its relationship with WTO Agreements and to the specifie trade-restrictive measures that may derive from it, it is c1ear that the international regulation of biotechnology is at the crossroads of trade and the environment.
The scope of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (also called the Cartagena Protocol) is the fust international treaty dealing with the transboundary movement of genetically modified organisms. What is most noteworthy about the Cartagena Protocol is that it is the first MEA to be negotiated in the absence of any c1ear scientific evidence.
1O
Signed in January 2000, after nearly four years of arduous negotiations, the Protocol entered into force on 11 September 2003. The main objective of the Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms (LMOs). The Protocol speaks of LMOs instead of the more commonly used terms 'genetically modified organisms' or 'transgenic organisms', which are often used interchangeably. Il The Protocol distinguishes three categories of LMOs: LMOs for voluntary introduction into the environment, such as seeds for planting, live fish for release, microorganisms for bioremediation; LMOs destined 10 See R. Eckersley, 'A Green Public Sphere ·in the WTû: The AmicU5 Curiae. Interventions in the Trans-Atlantic Biotech Dispute ' (2005) No. 2/ournal ofTrade tmd Environment Studies 5. For the author: 'Whereas the ozone and dimate change negotiations were prompted by major scientific discoveries (such as the "hole in the ozone layer"), or by extensive scientific research that commanded relativelywidespread agreement (the First Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). the biosafety negotiations proceeded on the basis of growing concern over the potential ratheT than actuaJ risks associated with a relatively new and tiule understood technology.'
Avaibble at www.ecolomK.s.-international.orglepaC2005_2_robvn_eckersler_wto....green_ public_sphere_amici_ec_btl.pdf. 1] The Prolocol applies ooly to those LMOs that have resulted from modern biotechnology. which allows the targeted change of an organism's genetic make-up by so-caUed recombinant nudeic acid techniques or by direct injection of nudcic Icid. thus going· beyond traditional methods of selective breeding.
for contained use, 'contained use' being defined in Article 3(b) of the Protocol to include activities in which LMOs are controlled by specifie measures that effectively limit their contact with, and their impact on, the extemal environment; and LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing (LMO-FFPs). The latter represent the large majority of LMOs, Le. genetically modified crops, such as soya beans, maize, canola and cotton. The Protocol does not cover consumer products derived from LMOs, such as corn flakes, flour, starch, seed-oi!, tomato paste or ketchup and pharmaceuticals. Annex III to the Protocol specifies general principles and a methodology for risk assessment ofLMOs. The Protocol establishes a harmonised set of international rules and procedures designed to ensure that countries are provided with the relevant information, through an information exchange system called 'Biosafety Clearing-House'. This Internet-based information system enables countries to make informed decisions before agreeing to the importation of LM Os. It a1so ensures that LMO shipments are accompanied by appropriate identifying documentation.
Although the Protocol covers the human health-and biodiversityrelated safety aspects of the transfer, handling and use of LMOs, the emphasis is ciearly on ensuring safety in the transboundary movement of LMOs. In a sense, the Protocol is a 'mixed environmental and trade agreement' .'2 Because of This dual nature and functionality, some scholars tend to adopt an extreme interpretation, qualifying the Cartagena Protocol as solely a 'trade agreement': The Cartagena Protocol can lead to trade-restrictive measures in a number of forms. The most "extreme trade-restrictive measure is obviouslya complete ban on the import of certain or alI LMOs which would conflict with several WTO provisions. Alternatively, a tradeaverse national authority might devise measures which, to a greater or lesser degree, artificially affect an LMO' s competitive position in the marketplace, which would of course also trigger accusations of a lack of WTO-consistency. There are other means through which an importing country can place obstacles in the way of GMOs, for instance through delays in the import authorisation process due to the 'advance informed agreement procedure'21 or other aspects of risk management. This risk of the Cartagena Protocol affecting WTO law or of WTO law affeeling the Cartagena Protocol raises a genera! question: must we interpret these interactions as conflicts berween the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO Agreements?
C The conflict berween the WTO Agreements and multilateraI environmentaI agreements: myth or reaIity!
The idea or theory of a rea! conflict between the WTO Agreements and MEAs belongs more to the domain of myth than to reality. lndeed, both the WTO system and the MEAs system recognise the nced to create interlinkages berween WTO law and international environmentallaw in order to avoid conflicts which would not be in the interests of either. This Decision has a broader scope than the Doha Declaration because it refers to the coordination of 'policies in the field of trade and environment' and to 'trade-related aspects of environmental policies'. Moreover, its wording is more holistic and inclusive than that of the Doha Declaration, which opts for a 'fragmented' treatment (based on the concept of STÛs) of the relationship between MEAs and WTû Agreements. Indeed, the Doha wording runs the risk of excluding many MEAs from the negotiations. In spite of the narrow focus of the Doha Declaration, no real progress on the issue was made in the Special Sessions of the WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment. Like the other trade and environment components ofthe Doha Agenda, the topic received almost no attention at the Cancun Ministerial Conference, and the draft ministerial declaration (which, in the end, was not adopted) contained a statement of the need simply to 'reaffirm our commitment to these negotiations'.24 It seems unlikely that any significant progress will presumption against conflict between MEAs and the WTO Agreements prevails.
D The presumption against conflict between MEAs and the WTO Agreements
The presumption against conflict between MEAs and the WTO Agreements has its roots not only in general public international law but also in the WTO system where the notion of conflict has a specific meaning and specific implications.
Scope and content of the 'presumption against conflict' in general public interrzationallaw
The presumption against conflict between MEAs and the WTO Agreements is based mainly on the principle according to which a treaty cannot implicitly 'contract OU!,29 of general international law.'" For general international law to be excluded, express provisions have to be embodied in a treaty. [t is the treaty as a whole which is law. The treaty as a whole transcends any ofits individual provisions or even the sum total ofits provisions. For the treaty. once signed and ratified, is more than the expression of the intention of the parties. It is part of international law and must be Interprete<! against the general background of its fuies :.mtl principles.:U
The requirement to interpret treaties as a component of a system of law is also supported in international jurisprudence. For example, in the Georges Pinson case, the Arbitral Tribunal stated:
Every international convention must he deemed tacitly to refer to general prindples of international law for aU questions which il does not itself resolve in express terms and in a different way.J4
Similarly, in the 1971 Advisory Opinion on South West Africa, the IC] found that, in arder for 'the right of termination of a treaty on account ofbreach' not ta he applicable, the following condition must apply:
it would be necessary to show that the mandates system ... excluded the application of the generai principle of law that a right of termination on account of breach must he presurncd to exist in respect of all trcaties .. , norms.'" Every new norm of international law is considered to have been created within the contexl of pre-existing internationallaw. and the presumption is that this new norm is bullt upon and develops existing law. This presumption implies a main legal consequence: for a new norm to deviate from existing law. explicit language must he found in the preamble to or the operative part of a treaty. In the field of biotechnology. MEAs such as the Cartagena Protocol conta in no wording to suggest that they may deviate from general rights and obligations contained in the WTO Agreements. It is accordingly not possible to presume the existence of a conflict between MEAs and the WTO Agreements in the absence of express clauses.
Morcover. the presumption against conflict of norms in international law is explicitly stated by a WTO panel in the Illdonesia -Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry case:
[W]e recall first that in public international Jaw there is a presumption against conflict .. , ln internationallaw for a conflict to exist between two treaties, three conditions have to he satistied. First, the treaties concerned must have the same parties. Second, the treaties mwt caver the same substantive sub;ect matter. Were it otherwise, there would be no possibility for confliel. Third. the provisions must confliet, in the sense that the provisions must impose mutually exclusive obligations,,) 7 This interpretation reveals that there is a priori no conflict between MEAs and the WTO Agreements. Indeed. the conditions for conflict stipulated by the panel are cumulative, i.e. in our case the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO Agreements do not have the same parties. they do not cover the same substantive subject matter and their provisions do not impose mutually exclusive obligations." A1though it might conceivably be argued that the substantive subject matter may be narrowly the same (e.g. market access). at Ieast one of the other two conditions for the determination in abstracto of a legal conflict -the 2 July 1998, WT/DS54/R, para. 14.28 and footnot. 649.
See section F below.
'imposition' of mutuaUy exclusive obligations -is not to be fullilled. 49 The notÎon of'subject matter' deals with the concept of înstrumentum and not with that of negotium. De jure. one cannat speak about the 'same subj«t matter' when referring to environmental agreements and trade agreements. The negotium, i.e. the rights and obligations contained in these specifie legal instruments. should not lead to the conclusion that these instruments have the same suhject matter. This would imply an extensive interpretation of the intent of the drafters of each of these instruments. For instance, the inclusion of a prohibition against imparts in an MEA does not irnply that this instrument has the same subjeet-matter as a WTO agreement. The inclusion of the right ta proteet health (Art. XX(b) of the GA'IT 1994) does nol mean that the GATT bas the same suhject matter as an MEA.
environment issues, particularly in the field ofbiotechnology, Le. in the regulation of biosafety as weil as in the application of intellectual property rights on plant genetic resources.
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The doctrine of lex specialis has been introduced into the trade and environment debate, inter alia, by the International Law Commission (ILC). The ILC has established a typology based on a distinction between three types of fragmentation or conflict of norms: (a) fragmentation through conflicting interpretations of general law; (b) fragmentation through emergence of speciallaw as exception to the generallaw; and (c) fragmentation through conflict between diffe.rent types of speciallaw. 51 According to the ILC, the debates on trade and environment reflect the third category of conflicts, i.e. a conflict between different types of special law. The ILC does not give a clear and objective indication of how trade and environment agreements are two conflicting lege speciales, nor indicate how to resolve such a supposed 'conflict'. The doctrine of /ex specialis is appropriate for the treatment of the relationship between a lex generalis and a speciallaw, but not for the relationship between two normative orders which may have the same legal status, are independent and derive from different areas oflaw as is the case for the WTO Agreements and MEAs. Indeed, neither WTO law nor MEAs consider themse1ves as being lex generalis or lex specialis towards each other, and thus the application of one of them cannot prevent the application of the other. 52 Lex specialis is weil suited to the resolution of norm conflicts within a single treaty or between treaties that have a 'strict' relationship to each other. 53 As correctly stated by one author:
Lex specialis does Dot provide a solution when two Dorms are regarded special, e.g., an environmental norm and a trade norm can be regarded In the same vein, the ratio legis according to which a treaty cannot implicitly 'contract out' from general public international law also applies to the relationship between different lege speciales: one lex specialis cannot ipso jure contract out from another speciallaw -i.e. exclude the application of another lex specialis -if this ' rationale of exclusion' is not explicitly provided by the terms of the said lex specialis. Thus, focusing on the doctrine of lex specialis rather than emphasising the need to strengthen principles of coherence and coexistence through the principle of 'not adding to or not diminishing rights and obligations provided for by other international agreements' would create a legal impasse that would threaten the coherence of the legal system.
(b) The right to determine the appropriate level of protection of the environ ment and public health is guaranteed by the application of the principle and embodied in WTO law The principle of not adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations provided for by other international agreements represents good policy in the negotiation and adjudication of the appropriate balance between trade and environmental concerns. For instance, within the WTO, each State is afforded freedom to adopt legislation that will determine the level of protection of health or the environment that it deems appropriate. The WTO legal system does not affect the right or the obligation to proteet the environment or health as provided for br MEAs. The right to determine the appropriate level of protection of health is principally set forth in the SPS Agreement. Article 3(3) of the SPS Agreement states: The WTO Appellate Body recognised in the Asbestos 55 case that the right to determine the leve! of protection ofhealth applies also to Article XX(b) of the GATT (and may also be applicable to Article XN(b) of the GATS):
[R]clating to the level of protection, we note that il is undisputed that WTO Membcrs have the right to determine the lellel of protection ofhealth theU they coruider appropriate in a given situation. France has determined, and the Panel accepted, that the chosen levcl of health protection br France is a 'halt' to the spread of asbestos-related health risks. By pro hibiting a1l forms of amphibole asbestos, and by severely restricting the use of chrysotile asbestos, the measure at issue is dearly designed and apt to achieve that level ofhealth protection.
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The right of States to adopt appropriat. measures was also recognised by the WTO Appellate Body in the Hormones case, in which il stated:
ITlhis right of a Member to establish ils own level of sanitary protection ... is an autonomous right and not an 'exception' from a 'general obligation,.s7
The autonomous character of the right to determine the appropriate level of sanitary protection in the context of the WTO demonstrates that there is no direct conHict between trade and the environment. Indeed, under the right to determine the appropriate level of sanitary protection, aState can decide to give priority to its right to protect the environment. The right of WTO Members to protect the environment and public health is recognised in the context of the WTO, and States remain free to determine the appropriate leveI of the protection of health at the national level. However. WTO Members are under an obligation to refrain from discriminatory actions when taking trade-restrictive measures for environmental and health purposes. This general obligation is not excluded from the Cartagena Protocol or from most MEAs. States parties to the Cartagena Protocol could give priority to their right to protect the environ ment and public health and at the same time remain consistent with the WTO Agreements provided they adhere to the provisions stipulated in these agreements.
SS European Commu.nities -Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products
(c) The absence ofhierarchy between MEAs and the WTO Agreements Another feature of the principle of not ad ding to or diminishing the rights and obligations provided for by other international agreements is that there is no hierarchy between MEAs and the WTO Agreements. International practice generally recognises the equality between different bodies of norms. That is to say. that an international norm is neither superior nor subordinate to another norm of international law. An express provision is required for an international norm to prevai! or to be subordinated to another norm.
The absence of a hierarchy between different international instruments is explicitly recognised in the preamble to several MEAs which can interact with the WTO AgreementS: 
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(a) Significance of the principle The principle of mutual supportiveness means that, while focusing on their own tasks and competencies, the trade and environment regimes should be mutually supportive. In order to maintain this mutual supportiveness, each framework should remain responsible and competent for the issues falling within its primary area of competence.
The fact that the above-mentioned regimes should each focus on their primary competence does not mean, however, that the WTO Agreements cannot deal with principles and rules that affect environment and biotechnology. At the same lime, MEAs are not, and should not be, prevented from incIuding rules and principles that affect trade. Rules and principles relating to international trade may indeed affect the environment and health; similarly, MEAs may have an impact on trade. Therefore, although each regime should focus on its primary competence, it is not prevented from adopting measures which affect the other regime. However, the concerns and interests of each regime should be taken into account by the other and deference'9 should be paid to the primary competence of either regime in a spirit of mutual 
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Mutual supportiveness is guided by a similar process. It is based on the idea that only where there is actual inconsistency between two treaties or two international norms do questions of exclusion arise. This having been established, in the field of trade and environment, the notion of 'mutual supportiveness' has an anticipatory character. lt implies that at both the 'institution al' and the 'regulatory' leveIs, some strategies are developed to reinforce the presumption against contlict between the WTO Agreements and MEAs. WTO, common long-term strategies and polides have never been put in place.
Aware of this need to strengthen inter-institutional cooperation, the Doha Declaration 62 states in paragraph 6:
We we1come the WfO's continued co-operation with UNEP and other inter-governmental environmental organizations,
The Declaration recognises the necessity for inter-institutional cooperation but creates uncertainties with regard to the results of such co-operation. In other words, no mention is . made in this paragraph of the applicability of trade rules which aim to protect the environment and which have been elaborated in organisations other than the WTO. This is why there is doubt as to the meaning of legal cooperation.
Paragraph 6 should also be read in conjunction with paragraph 31 (ii) of the Doha Declaration, which encourages negotiations conceming procedures for regular information exchange betwcen MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, and the criteria for the granting of observcr status.
Two problems may arise here. First, what is the legal value to he given to information exchanges? Will MEA dispute-settlement mechanisms and WTO panels he bound by the information they give to each other? For example, will the scientific studies organised by MEA secretariats be binding on WTO panels? Secondly, which criteria are going to determine the observer status? What are the 'relevant' MEA secretariats? Will MEAs with observer status be the only ones ta be taken into account within the WTO?
The Sutherland Report on the Future of the WTO gives sorne answers to these questions. It states that:
IEllements of cooperation exist between the secretariats ofthe WTO and the United Nations Environmcnt Programme (UNEP), with a more recent opening to the secretariats of Multilateral Environmcntal Agreements (MEAs) . Further horizontal cooperation will depend on the conclusions of In any case, the Sutherland Report emphasises the principle according to which the scope of horizontal coordination must he limited, taking into account the need to preserve both the creation and the interpretation ofWTO rules 'from undue external interference,.64 (c) 'Regulatory' aspects of the principle of mutual supportiveness: the issue of standardisation Another way of promoting mutual supportiveness is to promote standardisation, as is the case in the field ofbiotechnology. The concept of an international standard has a double meaning. il may refer either to a recognised norm of intemationallaw, or else to a principle of international law that does not (yet) enjoy Ihis kind of general recognition. Either way, however, it does refer to some level or model whose realisation is desirable, and which ought to serve as a benchmark for the evaluation of a situation or of a behaviour. 65 [n international trade, the use of standards is aimed 10 prevent hidden protectionist !rade This means that a WTO Member which imposes an import restriction that is in full conformity with a standard of the Codex Alimentarius will in principle not he obliged to furnish any scientific proof of its justification. On the other hand, a government that uses norms which are more demanding than the most pertinent international standard will have to provide scientific justification for its rationale.
However, promoting mutual supportiveness between MEAs and the WTO Agreements by means of international standardisation is not as simple as it seems. For instance, the SPS Agreement lists the relevant standards, guideJines and recommendations. International standards may take the form of treaties such as the Cartagena Protoeol. Sec L. assessment. n The WTO Agreements (the GATT, the SPS and the TBT) are concerned -albeit to varying degrees -with risk assessment. But it is above aU the SPS that accords a preponderant weight to scientific evidence. At the same time, the Cartagena Protocol is not indifferent to rules of risk assessment determined and interpreted by WTO dispute seulement bodies. According to paragraph 3 of Annex III to the Protocol, 'risk assessment should be carried out in a scientificaUy sound and transparent manner, and can take into account expert advice of, and guide1ines developed by, relevant international organi.zations'. The WTO is not, strietly speaking, an international organisation specialised in risk assessment. 73 Nonetheless, an important bridge between the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO Agreements could be the Codex Alimentarius. 74 Indeed, with regard to food, the SPS Agreement invites States to conform to the assessment and standardisation procedures of the Codex Alimentarius. 75 No provision in the Cartagena Protocol opposes recourse to the assessment techniques in the Codex?6
The TBT Agreement also encourages WTO Members to use existing international standards or their relevant elements for the development of their technical regulations 'except when such international standards ... would be ineffective or inappropriate' to achieve a given objective. This are presumed -and this presumption is simple and rebuttable -'not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade,.7. The Cartagena Proto col could serve more easily as a basis for a technical regulation or a standard decreed bya State in the context of the TBT Agreement because the TBT Agreement, in contrast to the SPS Agreement, does not refer to the 'identification' by the TBT Committee of international standards.
Standard-setting work has been going on in various bodies of international organisations dealing with issues at the interface of trade, agriculture, the environment and health. Many of them are part of the UN Inter-Agency Network for Safety in Biotechnology (JANB), which was set up in 1999 to enhance the exchange of information and facilitale cooperation. ln 1999, the Codex Alimenta,;us Commission 79 established an Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods derived from Biotechnology (TFFBT) to consider the health and nutritional implica· tions of such foods. The objectives of the Task Force were to develop standards, guidelines or recommendations for foods derived from biotechnology on the basis of scientific evidence and risk analysis.
The Task Force has produced three texts, which were adopted at the twenty-sixth session of the Codex Alimenta,;us Commission in Rome in which are characteristic of a precautionary approach to food safety, are not provided for by Codex Alimentarius in respect of conventional food.
Work on issues related to the risk assessment and management of GMOs and GM-derived products is also being done in other Codex committees. Thus, for example, the Codex Committee on Methods of Analysis and Sampling (CCMAS) is currently working on methods of analysis for GM foods. The labelling of GM foods and food ingredients has been under discussion in the Codex Committee on Food Labelling (CCFL) for several years.
The World Health Organization (WHO) addresses a wide range of issues in the field of biotechnology and human health, induding the safety evaluation of vaccines produced using biotechnology, human doning and gene therapy. Regarding the issue of safety assessment of GM food, WHO has, since the 199Os, been engaged in a series ofJoint Expert Consultations with the FAO. The outcome ofthese consultations has been extensively used by the Codex TFFBT to develop the abovementioned principles and guidelines. Furthermore, the WHO Food Safety Department is conducting a study of the implications of GM foods for human health and development.· ' " l ' ; "
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and, at its sixth meeting in March-April 2004, it considered a Supplement to ICPM No. lion pest-risk analysis for LMOs. Finally, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has been involved in international regulatory work on GMOs since the mid1980s. Il is currently implementing a projecr financed by the Global Environment Facility on the development of national biosafety frameworks.
84 One hundred and twenty-three countries are participating in this project, which is designed to assist countries to set up their own national framework for LMOs so that they can meet the requirements of the Cartagena Protocol. The project also aims to promote appropriate regional and sub-regional cooperation. As goods, GMOs are subject to the disciplines of WTO law. The methods of its application, however, are neither simple nor obvious, due not only to the diversity ofGMOs and their potential risks, but also to the plurality of restrictive trade measures to which they can give rise. What is more, the WTO system itself, which is constituted through a series of different agreements, is complex. Trade in GMOs could be assessed, depending on the case, according to either the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement or even the GATT 1994. Assessments must be made on a case-by-case basis, according to the GMO in question and the risks it carries (sanitary andlor environmental). Despite the barriers and difficulties contained mostly in the GATT and the SPS Agreement, trade-restrictive measures whieh are or may be contained in biotechnology regulations could be WTO-compatible, and thus they would contradict in their application the notion of a 'confliet' between the Cartagena Protocol and WTO law.
Regulations on GMOs and GA TT 1994
Several scenarios may be envisaged in examining the relationsbip between the GMO regulations and the GATT 1994: violation of the most-favoured-nation clause (Article 1 of the GATT), violation of national treatment (Article III of the GATT), and violation of the prohibition on quantitative restrictions (Article XI of the GATT). Nevertheless, the scenario whieh seems to he at the same time the most obvious and the most complicated is that of the difference hetween a particuIar regulation and the national treatment c1ause.1t is important to analyse the issue of likeness between GMO products and non-GMO products in this context.
Here the obstacle relates to the difficulty of proving that there is a difference between GM products and their non-GM conventional counterparts. In other words, a violation of Article III of the GATT, based principaUy on discrimination between Iike products, may be envisaged. 88 Thus, we must examine whether the derogatory mechanism of Article XX of the GATT permits discrimination between GM products and non-GM products. Article XX of the GATT offers two tracks or 'safe harbours,.89 The lirst is that of Article XX(b), which provides for the possibility of restrictions on trade through measures that are 'necessary to protect huma n, animal or plant life or health'. In the interpretation of the test of necessity, the AppeUate Body has stated that '[tlhe more vital or important [the] corn mon interests or values' pursued, the easier it would be to accept as 'necessary' measures designed to achieve those ends"o Applying this reasoning to the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body considered that the objective of the preservation of human life and health is both vital and important.
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GMO regulations or measures related to GMOs aim in principle to protect the environment and health; from this perspective, they appear to pursue a 'vital and important common value'. The question, then, is whether there is an alternative measure that would achieve the same end and that is less restrictive oftrade than a stated measure on the import of GMOs. If this is not the case, we can conclude that the 'necessity' of the measure and the test of paragraph (b) of Article XX woutd be satislied.
Article XX offers another track: that of paragraph (g), which authorises the enactment of trade-restrictive measures 'relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption'. The Appellate Body, by giving a broad interpretation to the concept of exhaustible natural resources as including 'living resources', opened the WTO system to a broad acceptance of environment-related concems. Referring to the international regulation of GMOs, principally through the Cartagena Protoeot, it appears that one of the aims of this regulation is precisely to prevent GMOs from causing loss ofbiological diversity:
ITI he objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of saCe transfer, handling and use ofliving modified 'a qualified exemption'08 of the obligation stat~ in Article 2(2) of the SPS Agreement not to maintain SPS measures without sufficient scientific evidence. However, this makes the ambit of precaution rather limited in the framework of the WTO. Suffice it to refer to the rigour of the criteria for application of Article 5(7) to be convinced. 99 Neverthe!ess, sorne elements favour an application of precaution in the treatment of risk by the WTO.'oo The panel charged with the Asbestos case admitted that it is not possible to require a level of absolute certainty from a Member who wishes to invoke Article XX of the GATT:
[Tlo make the adoption of health measures concerning a definite risk dcpend upon establishing with certainty a risk ... would have the cffcct of preventing any possibility of legislating in the field of public health,lOl
The interpretation by the Dispute Settlement Body of the scope of risk assessment constitutes another factor favouring the acceptance of a precautionary treatment of risk in the WTO framework. The case of Australia -Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon provided an opportunity for the Appellate Body to explain that 'the "risk" evaluated in a risk assessment must be an ascertainable risk ... This does not mean, however, that a Member cannot determine its own appropriate level of protection to be "zero risk":,o2 FinaUy, the evaluation of risk on which a measure is based can include non-quantifiable data of a factual or qualitative nature and is not exclusively limited to quantitative scientific data. This interpretation was delivered in the Hormones case by the Appellate Body, which rejected the initial interpretation of the panel, according to which the evaluation of risk would have to be quantitative and establish a minimum leve! of risk. 103 These elements relating to the precautionary approach show that, despite the importance of predictability in the multilateral trade system, 
G Conclusion
As Thomas Cottier explains, approach based on coexistence and coherence; the international legol order benefits from the normative proliferation in both the trade and environ ment areas. However, the principle of mutual supportiveness is not sufficient in itself to ensure coexistence and coherence. It needs to be given 'body' by various means, be they institutional, normative or procedural. As Pascal Lamy, Director General of the World TTade Organization, clearly pointed out in his speech given at the Eighth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity: 'for mutual reinforcement to truly take place, policy-makers in both the trade and environment domoins must continue to search for the right balance between the two sets of policy goals ... The objective of ongoing discussions is to ensure a harmonious co-existence between the different legal regimes that we have creoted internationaIly,'"6 This is a task that has yet to be achieved. 
